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from the statute.54 Until the MVAIC Law is relieved of this formalistic evi-
dentiary safeguard, "physical contact" as defined in Eisenberg must remain
operative as a condition precedent to the presentation of hit and run claims.
GARY H. FEINBERG
INTERNATIONAL LAW-TREATY STATING THAT JURISDICTION OVER
THE DISPOSITION Or MoVABLES Is To BE DETERMINED BY THEIR SITUS CON-
STRED To MEAN THAT MOVABLES MUST BE DISPOSED OF BY THE LAW OF
DECEDENT'S DomicILE
An American citizen residing in Switzerland died testate in 1954, leaving
his entire estate, which included personal property in both Switzerland and New
York, to his widow. Also surviving the decedent was his acknowledged illegiti-
mate son who would be entitled, under a Swiss statute, to a nine-sixteenths
share of the estate, notwithstanding the will. Two weeks after the decedent's
death, as a result of an ex parte proceeding before a Swiss Justice of the
Peace, the widow obtained the Swiss equivalent of a simple probate, declaring
her the sole heir under the will unless and until a formal contest was
initiated. The widow then brought the Swiss personalty to New York. In
1957, the son took part in a New York probate proceeding which found the
decedent to be a New York domiciliary and, in effect, barred the son from a
1958 accounting proceeding. In 1958 the son secured a decree from a Swiss
appellate court declaring the decedent to have been a Swiss domiciliary, and
granting him the statutory share of the estate. In 1961, he brought an action
in the New York County Surrogate's Court to vacate or reopen that court's
1957 and 1958 decrees. The son contended that according to article VI of the
Swiss-United States Treaty of 1850,1 succession to the personalty was to be
decided by Swiss courts according to Swiss law and, thus, the New York
Surrogate's Court had no subject matter jurisdiction beyond directing the
widow to return the property to the jurisdiction of the Swiss courts. The Sur-
rogate denied his application and the Appellate Division affirmed the denial
without a written opinion.2 The Court of Appeals affirmed in a four-three de-
cision. Held, despite the wording of the treaty, its interpretation should be
that jurisdiction over movables is in the courts of and governed by the laws of
the decedent's domicile. Therefore, petitioner is estopped from challenging
54. Four months before the Eisenberg decision a bill was introduced in the New York
Legislature which would have deleted the physical contact requirement from section 617.
It passed in the Assembly but was defeated in the Insurance Committee of the Senate.
S.2040, A.4202, 189th N.Y. Legis. (1966).
1. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, Reciprocal Establishment, and Extradition of
Criminals With Switzerland, Nov. 25, 1850, 11 Stat. 587 (1850), 16 Martens N.R.G. (10
sr.) 25, T.S. No. 353 [hereinafter cited treaty].
2. 24 A.D.2d 705, 261 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1st. Dep't 1965).
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the unappealed Surrogate's Court decree since the decedent had been found
a New York domiciliary. Matter of Rougeron, 17 N.Y.2d 264, 217 N.E.2d
639, 270 N.Y.S.2d 578, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966).
The traditional Anglo-American view is that the disposition of movables
by will or by succession in case of intestacy, is governed by the law of a
decedent's domicile,3 while the law of the situs governs the disposition of
immovables.4 Several Continental nations do not follow the Anglo-American
concepts of succession, but rather adhere to the Roman law doctrine of unitary
succession, applying the law of the domicile or the law of the nationality to
the succession of the entire estate.5 Among these nations is Switzerland, which
applies the law of the domicile.6 Thus, in both the United States and Switzerland,
domicile is the connecting factor where there is a conflict of laws pertaining
to the disposition of movables.7 It is apparently settled law that conceptually
a person cannot have two simultaneous domiciles8 and, also, that domicile is
determined according to the lex fori.9 When a decedent leaves any part of
his estate in New York, there is a sufficient basis to give the surrogate juris-
diction to admit his will to probate.10 Upon probate, New York law is applied
to determine the domicile of a decedent. If he is found to have been a New
York domiciliary, New York law will govern the succession to his property.
If he is found a domiciliary of another jurisdiction, his personal property will
either be transferred to that jurisdiction or distributed in New York according
to the laws of the other jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the son asserted that article VI of the treaty is to
be literally applied so that movables must be disposed of according to the law
and by the judges of their situs at the time of death, rather than by the law
of the decedent's domicile. If the son's interpretation is correct, the treaty,
being the supreme law of the land, will supersede the Anglo-American rule of
3. E.g., Cross v. United States Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125 (1892);
Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N.Y. 424 (1871). However, in certain related areas
of personal property law some cases have applied the law of the situs to determine
rights to and validity of the inter vivos transfer of personal property. See Wyatt v.
Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965), 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 702
(1966); Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933).
4. E.g., Knox v. Jones, 47 N.Y. 389 (1872); Matter of Osborn, 151 Misc. 52, 270
N.Y. Supp. 616 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
5. See Wolff, Private International Law 567-76 (2d ed. 1950), where the author evalu-
ates the scission and unitary systems and lists the system foliowed by each European country.
6. Matter of Schneider, 198 Misc. 1017, 1025, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652, 660, aff'd on rehearing,
198 Misc. 1017, 100 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Surr. Ct. 1950); Nussbaum, American-Swiss Private
International Law, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 186, 195 (1947) ; Wolff, op. cit. supra note 5, at 568.
7. Chesire, Private International Law 44-45 (6th ed. 1961) describes the connecting
factor as the selection of "the legal system that governs the matter ...i.e., some out-
standing fact which establishes a natural connexion between the factual situation before
the court and a particular system of law."; see also Graveson, The Conflict of Laws
54, 59 (5th ed. 1965) ; Falconbridge, Essays on the Conflict of Laws 130 (2d ed. 1954).
8. Graveson, op. cit. supra note 7, at 151; Chesire, op. cit. supra note 7, at 172.
9. See, e.g., cases cited 25 Am. Jur. 2d, Domicil § 3 n.19 (1966), and 15 C.J.S. Conflict
of Laws § 9 n.94 (1939); Falconbridge, op. cit. supra note 7, at 130.
10. Matter of Barandon, 41 Misc. 380, 381, 84 N.Y. Supp. 937, 938 (Surr. Ct. 1903).
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domicile as applied to personal property.1 Article VI of the Swiss-United
States Treaty of 1850 states:
Any controversy that may arise among the claimants to the same
succession, as to whom the property shall belong, shall be decided ac-
cording to the laws and by the judges of the country in which the
property is situated.12
By a literal application of the treaty, movables, which are generally
widely scattered and characteristically transient, would be distributed ac-
cording to a wide variety of local laws.13 It is because of this characteristic
of movables that the law of the decedent's domicile is applied to achieve
"unitary administration and distribution."'' 4 Two New York cases have dealt
with the disposition of a decedent's estate where a conflict between New
York-Swiss law existed. 15 The courts in both cases unequivocally employed
the conventional Anglo-American domicile rule rather than applying article
VI of the treaty which was clearly applicable.'
In light of the absurd result which would be reached by a literal construc-
tion of the treaty,17 it is proper to look beyond its literal meaning and to its
history to gain an insight into its construction.' 8 Article VI of the 1850 treaty
is derived from the Swiss-American Treaty of 1847.'9 In the Message of the
Swiss Federal Council of December 3, 1850, to the Swiss National Assembly,20
it was recognized that article VI could refer to either the last domicile of a
decedent or to the situs of the property. The Message states that the former
was the intended meaning. This conclusion has been adopted by the two Ameri-
can writers who have commented on the treaty.2 ' The Message further states
that in order to clear up this ambiguity, the Federal Council in 1850 proposed,
11. Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963,
43 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
12. 11 Stat. 587, 591 (1850).
13. See Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 195.
14. Falconbridge, Renvoi in New York and Elsewhere, 6 Vand. L. Rev. 708, 730(1953). Compare statement that the law of the situs is applied to immovables in Anglo-
American Courts because "the law-making and law-enforcing agencies of the country
in which the land is situated have exclusive control over such land." Matter of Schneider,
198 Misc. at 1020, 96 N.Y.S.2d at 656 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
15. Matter of Batsholts, 188 Misc. 867, 66 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Surr. Ct. 1946); Matter
of Barandon, 41 Misc. 380, 84 N.Y. Supp. 937 (Surr. Ct. 1903).
16. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 197.
17. See id. at 195.
18. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187 (1961) (notes exchanged in negotiating 1881
treaty between the United States and Yugoslavia considered relevant).
19. 9 Stat. 902 (1847). The last part of article 1 states: "in case any dispute should
arise between claimants to the same succession, as to the property thereof, the question
shall be decided according to the laws and by the judges, of the country in which the
property is situated." Id. at 903.
20. See 5 Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America
869 (1937) (translation from the French and German original) (The work is an
official publication of the Dep't of State, edited by Miller). The Message is paraphrased
in Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 195-96.
21. Nussbaum, id. at 195-96; Falconbridge, supra note 14, at 730; accord, Matter of
Schneider, 198 Misc. at 1025, 96 N.Y.S.2d at 660 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
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inter alia, that the treaty be changed so that the law and the judges of the
last domicile of a decedent would govern the disposition of the estate. How-
ever, according to the Message, the American negotiators turned down the
proposal fearing that a change in the language of the 1847 treaty "might bring
about some unforeseen obstacle in the United States Senate, where it is greatly
desired to preserve in judicial matters the expressions consecrated in other
treaties .... ,,2 The negotiators were certain that the meaning given to
article VI would be that the law of domicile would govern the disposition of
the entire estate.23 The Swiss National Assembly apparently adopted the
treaty with this understanding in mind,24 but there is no clear indication that
the same is true of the United States Senate.2 5 A dispatch of the American
negotiator to Washington on December 26, 1850, reads in part:
I had the honor to transmit to you two copies [not now found in the
archives of the Department of State]-one in French, the other in
German-of the message, written by the President, with which
the Federal Council accompanied the Treaty to the National As-
sembly.26
Preceding the printed translation of the Message, the editor states that
"the lengthy message seems not to have been heretofore printed in the United
States."27 Nevertheless the contents of the Message are consistent with the
prevailing view in the United States and Europe at the time; namely, the
disposition of movables is governed by the law of the last domicile of the
decedent. 28 In litigation over movables involving a conflict of Swiss and United
States law, the Swiss courts have been consistent in interpreting the treaty-
on the basis of the Message-to mean that the courts of the domicile of a
decedent have jurisdiction over the disposition of his movables. 28
After a lengthy discussion, the Court of Appeals indicated that if the treaty
were literally interpreted, the jurisdiction of the New York Surrogate's Court
would not extend beyond ordering the widow to return the contested personal
property to the Swiss courts. The Court did not have to decide whether the
petitioner had waived this jurisdictional objection by participating in the
1957 probate proceeding, since it ruled against his requested interpretation.
Relying primarily on English translation of the Message of the Swiss Federal
Council, the Court concluded that the diplomatic representatives of the United
States and Switzerland apparently recognized "that the only proper interpreta-
tion [of article VI] was that jurisdiction would be in the courts and place
22. 5 Miller, op. cit. supra note 20, at 869.
23. Ibid.; Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 195.
24. 5 Miller, op. cit. supra note 20, at 845-906 where the various documents regarding
the negotiation of the treaty are fully published.
25. Ibid.
26. Id. at 864.
27. Id. at 865.
28. Story, Conflict of Laws 633 (4th ed. 1852).
29. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 196. See Matter of Schneider, 198 Misc. at 1026-28,
96 N.Y.S.2d 661-62, where two of the Swiss cases are quoted.
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of the decedent's legal domicile.. .. ,,30 Hence, once the Surrogate's Court found
the decedent to be a New York domiciliary, it had the requisite jurisdiction to
dispose of his movables according to the terms of his will. The majority further
supported their decision by finding that contrary to the assertion of the peti-
tioner, he did in fact know that his father had left personal property in
Switzerland at the time of his death and that the widow had removed the
property to New York. Thus, by participating in the original probate pro-
ceeding in New York, he recognized that the traditional domicile rule as to
personal property was incorporated in the treaty. The three dissenting judges,
while not contesting the majority's interpretation of the treaty, argued the
equities of the entire case. If the widow had left the property in Switzerland,
the son would have obtained his statutory share. Thus, they argue that the
effect of the majority decision is to allow the widow to take the law into her
own hands and unilaterally decide the choice of law by removing the property
to New York.
This is the first reported case in the United States directly construing
article VI of the treaty as it applies to movables. The Court of Appeals'
decision can be considered a reaffirmation of the conventional domicile rule
in spite of the treaty language to the contrary. The policy considerations
underlying this rule must have been in the thoughts of the majority when they
considered the case. Also, the finding that the petitioner knew of the personalty
in Switzerland and, hence, could have litigated the treaty issue in 1957 could
not have been viewed favorably in light of the reluctance of courts to open
probate proceedings except under exceptional circumstances. 3 ' However, the
equitable contentions of the minority are of considerable merit. If the Swiss
Justice of the Peace had issued or denied a probate decree which had been
upheld under Swiss law, the New York litigation would never have taken place.
The petitioner would have received a statutory share of the personalty in Switzer-
land. It seems unjust that the petitioner's right-or lack of right depending on
one's point of view-to share in the property should depend on such fortuitous
circumstances. Nevertheless, from a policy standpoint, the Court was justified in
not giving the treaty a literal interpretation. The majority was able to escape from
a literal application by relying on the diplomatic understanding described in the
Message of 1850. However, as construed by the majority, the treaty does nothing
more than incorporate the existing conflict of laws doctrine. Thus, the treaty itself
does not resolve the problem of the instant case; namely, what course of action the
courts should follow when a decedent is declared by two different courts to have
been domiciled within their respective jurisdictions and the decedent's personal
property has been removed from one jurisdiction to the other after his death.
It is questionable whether the Court should have felt compelled to interpret
30. Instant case at 272, 217 N.E.2d at 644, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
31. Matter of Volkenberg, 160 Misc. 257, 289 N.Y. Supp. 1058 (Surr, Ct. 1936),
aff'd mnem., 251 App. Div. 800, 298 N.Y. Supp. 176 (1st Dep't 1937).
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the treaty as it did. First, there is some doubt as to the existence of the
understanding. 2 Second, it appears that the United States Senate was not
aware of the Message and, in any case, the Senate ratified a treaty and not a
message written in a foreign language. Also, in light of the clear language of
article VI, it cannot be said that its purpose was merely to crystallize for
posterity the existing domicile rules. The treaty, though, must have some
meaning. The most reasonable conclusion then is that the treaty was designed
to assure that the law of the situs of personal property at the time of death
would govern its disposition in cases of conflict of domicile (i.e., concurrent
domicile) where the personal property has been removed after the decedent's
death. Thus, the disposition of movables would be accomplished in an orderly
and equitable manner rather than have the dispositional rights to the movables
depend, as in the instant case, on who got to the property first. This would
also result in the giving "of a suitable respect for the decrees of other civilized
countries. . .3.3, In addition, if article VI is viewed in relation to article
V,34 order and equity in the disposition of an estate3 5 would appear to be
the object36 of this section of the Treaty.
BRUcE D. DRucCR
TORTS-ATTRACTIVE NPIJsANCE-PROPERTY OWNER NOT LIABLE FOR
INJURIES SUFFERED BY A CHILD PLAYING WITH A METAL GRATING IMBEDDED
IN A PUBLIC SIDEWALK
Five year-old George Cuevas, plaintiff in this negligence action, was injured
while playing with several other children on a public sidewalk next door to his
home. Imbedded in the sidewalk was a set of hinged metal gratings covering the
entrance to an unused door leading into the defendant's cellar. The mechanism
by which the gratings could be locked had been broken for about a year prior
to the accident, and the gratings had not been secured in any manner during that
time. Plaintiffs' evidence indicated that neighborhood children played with the
gratings frequently, opening the metal doors and letting them slam shut, and
that the defendants, who were aware of the children's activities, nonetheless did
nothing to correct the situation. Plaintiff was injured while watching a playmate
32. Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 196.
33. Instant case at 274, 217 N.E.2d at 645, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 586 (dissenting opinion).
34. See Matter of Schneider, 198 Misc., at 1025, 96 N.Y.S.2d at 660 (Surr. Ct. 1950),
where the court stated that article V defines ". . . the capacity and the power of citizens
of each nation to deal with property located within the borders of the other country."
35. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879) (In a state where aliens were
not permitted to either sell or hold real property, article V was applied so as to give the
Swiss successors the lesser right of selling the real property.).
36. See generally Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 (1931) (In construing treaty
its purpose and the context of the provision in question control.). See also B. Altman
& Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600 (1912) where the court adopted the definition
of a treaty as "a compact made between two or more independent nations, with a
view to the public welfare."
